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Optimal Demand Response and Supply Schedule
Under Market-Driven Price: A Stackelberg
Dynamic Game Approach
Yunhan Huang
Abstract—In this work, we use a Stackelberg infinite discrete-
time dynamic game model to study the optimal supply schedule
and the optimal demand response under a market-driven dy-
namic price. A two-layer optimization framework is established.
At the lower layer, for each user, different appliances are
scheduled for energy consumption. For enegy provider, different
generators are utilized for energy generation. At the upper level,
with the supplier acting as a leader and the users acting as
followers, a Stackelberg dynamic game is used to capture the
interaction among the energy provider and the users where
the energy provider and the users care only about their own
cost. We analyze the one-leader-N-followers Stackelberg dynamic
game and characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium. We provide
a closed-form Nash solution of the optimal dynamic demand
response problem when the supply is announced. A set of
linear constraints is developed to characterize the Stackeberg
equilibrium. Simulation results show that the price is driven to
a reasonable value. Also, the total demand and the supply is
balanced.
Index Terms—Smart Grid, Dynamic Game, Stackelberg Equi-
librium, Dynamic Price, Distributed Demand Response.
I. INTRODUCTION
Equipped with modern information, communication and
electronics technology, the goal of providing reliable, efficient,
secure, and quality energy generation/distribution/consumption
in power grid becomes achievable. People uses smart grid to
describe this kind of next generation electrical power grid.
Developing smart grid has become an urgent global priority
as its economic, environmental, and societal benefit will be
enjoyed by generations to come.
Smart grid enables the end-customers and the suppliers
to participate into the market to provide a cost-effective
and reliable energy demand and supply. The reliable and
efficient communication infrastructure plays a key role in
connecting the supply side and the demand side and managing,
controlling, optimizing different devices and systems in the
smart grid. In the demand side, people depends on demand
side management to minimize the power cost, reduce the
fluctuation of power grid [1]–[3]. Direct load control and
smart pricing are two popular approaches in demand side
management. For smart pricing, researchers focus on how
to design the price for manager/authority/utility company to
reduce consumption at peak hours, attract more customers,
maximize their profit [4]–[6]. Usually, the price is set to be a
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function of the total demand of all users. There is little work
in the literature, which considers the price that is driven by the
market. Market-driven dynamic price is determined by not just
the current total demand but also the supply, the past demand
and the past price. Besides, many works study just the demand
side management and simplify the effects of supply side [2],
[7]. However, the interaction between the demand side and the
supply side is non-negligible.
In this paper, we jointly consider the optimal demand
response and the optimal supply schedule under the market-
driven dynamic price. The market price is modeled by the
sticky price dynamics where the current price is determined
by demand, supply, past price. Moreover, to characterize the
price volatility, a stochastic random variable is added to the
dynamics. The supplier in the market aims to minimize his
cost (maximize his profit) by schedule his supply based on the
knowledge on the price dynamics. Users in the market mini-
mize their cost by selecting an optimal demand response based
on the knowledge on the price dynamics and the scheduled
supply. The interactions between the price, the demand and
the supply are intertwined and hart to model. Here, we utilize
a stochastic discrete-time infinite dynamic game with finite
horizon to model this scenario and the Stackelberg equilibrium
solution [8], [9] is used to characterize the optimal demand
response and the optimal supply schedule. We obtain a closed-
form Nash equilibrium solution which refers to the optimal
demand response corresponding to a given supply schedule.
Further, a set of linear constraints are developed to characterize
the Stackelberg equilibrium. We call the problem modeled by
the stochastic dynamic game the upper level problem. In the
lower level, for each user, an optimal power allocation problem
is solved individually for scheduling different appliances to
maximize the utility. On the supply side, the supplier allocates
the work of generation to different generators. The lower level
problems are modeled by a set of decoupled convex/concave
static optimization problems. In the simulation results, we
present the evolution of the market-driven dynamic price
and the corresponding optimal demand response and optimal
supply schedule. The results show that the demand and the
supply can be tuned to be balanced by the dynamic price.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The
two layer optimization framework is formulated in Section II.
In Section III, we analyze the proposed two-level optimization
and dynamic game model. A closed-form Nash solution of the
users corresponding to supply schedule is obtained in a closed-
form. A set of linear constraints are developed to characterize
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Fig. 1. Framework: Upper level demand response and supply schedule
problem and lower level consumption and generation allocation problem.
the Stackelberg equilibrium. Simulation results are studied in
Section IV. Conclusions are included in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we propose a Stackelberg dynamic game
model for optimal demand response and supply schedule in
the smart grid. The framework is comprised of two levels of
problems as illustrated in Fig. 1. At the upper level, the energy
supplier announces the energy supply schedule. The energy
supply is scheduled to minimize the energy supplier’s cost. For
users, the demand response management device of each user
purchases power from the market based on its demand and the
price. At the lower level, the energy supplier allocates the work
of generation to multiple generators like wind driven generator,
solar generator etc. The scheduler of each user allocates its
demand power to multiple appliances such as the refrigerator,
the plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV), microwaves etc. At
the upper level, the decisions are made by solving hierarchical
optimization problem where the supplier announces its supply
while the schedulers of the users decide their demands. Both
the supplier and the users aim to minimize their own cost based
on the market-driven dynamic price. So, at the upper level, the
supplier and the users constitute the leader and the followers
of a stackerlberg dynamic game. While at the lower level,
the optimal power allocation within each user is decoupled
from other users. And the supplier arranges its generation
independently. Hence, the decisions at the lower level can be
modeled by static convex optimization models.
A. Upper Level: A Stackelberg Dynamic Game Model
Let l denote the power supplier and N be the set of users
or households in the power grid. Let s ≥ 0 be the power
supply in the grid which is decided by the energy supplier.
And dit ≥ 0, i ∈ N denotes the demand of the i-th player
at time t ∈ Z+ in the grid. The power price pt is a market-
driven dynamic price which evolves according to the following
dynamics [10]–[12]:
pt+1 = (1 + ωt)pt + f(dt, st) + θt (1)
with initial condition p1 > 0, where ωt < 0 is the parameter
that suggests the stickiness of the price in response to the
demand and supply; dt =
∑
i∈N d
i
t; θt, t ∈ Z+ is a set of
statistically independent Gaussian random numbers with zero
mean, and cov(θt) > 0,∀t ∈ Z+, which models the volatility
in the market [10]; f(·, ·) : R+×R+ → R is a force function
that drives the price which is based on the total demand dt
and the supply st. The price is driven up if the demand is
high but is driven down when the supply is high. The price at
time t + 1, pt+1, is based on by the price, the total demand
and the supply at time t, i.e., pt, dt and st. This is due to
the price delay: the delay with which the energy response to
information [12]. The price could be negative .We let f(·, ·)
take the following form:
f(dt, st) = γ(dt − st). (2)
The objective of user i is to minimize his own cost by
deciding the demand dit at each time slot t based on the
evolution of the price and his own utility. We utilize the
following cost functional to characterize the cost of user i
during time 1 to T :
Ci(di,d−i, s, pt) = E
T∑
t=1
−ui(t, dit) + ptdit +
1
2
αitd
i
t
2
(3)
where d−i = {dj , j 6= i, j ∈ N}; ui(·, ·) : T ×R+ → R+
is the stage utility function that describes the utility obtained
by consuming energy dit, where T = {1, 2, ..., T} denotes the
set of time slots. The second term characterizes the payment
of user i consuming dit unit of power. The quadratic term
1
2α
i
td
i
t
2 is the user i’s adjustment cost on power usage where
αit is positive for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T. The supply schedule
s = {st, t ∈ T}.
The aim of the energy supplier is to minimize his own cost
which is written as follows:
Cl(s,d, pt) = E
T∑
t=1
β(t, st)− ptst + 1
2
κt(st − dt)2 (4)
where β(·, ·) : T × R+ → R+ is the generation cost that
describes the cost of generating st unit of power at each time
slot t. The second term is the profit of selling st unit of power
and the last one represents a penalty to the leader who as a
leader has the responsibility to balance the supply and demand
where κt ∈ R++.
The energy supplier who acts as a leader announces his
generation strategy to the market. The users who react ratio-
nally to the leader’s decision can be called followers. Both the
energy supplier and the users aim to minimize their own cost
subject to the evolution of the price which constitutes a one-
leader-N-followers Stackelberg dynamic game. In this game,
the leader aims to minimize the cost functional (4) and the
followers minimize the cost functional (3) subject to the price
dynamics (1).
B. Lower Level: Optimal Local Allocation
In this part, the discuss how the users and the energy
supplier allocates their consumption and generation at the
lower level.
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1) Optimal Generation Allocation: The energy supplier
is equipped with multiple resources for power generation.
For example, in a microgrid, the supplier can utilize wind
generator, solar generator and thermal generator. Let G be the
set of G generators for the supplier. At each time t, the power
generated by generator g is egt . We define an energy generation
scheduling vector et = [e1t , e
2
t , ..., e
G
t ] ∈ RG+. The supplier
seeks to allocate power generation task to its generators by
minimizing the total cost subject to the power generation con-
straint st. This is described by the the generation optimization
problem (GO) as follows.
(GO) min
et∈RG+
∑
g∈G
1
2
δgt e
g
t
2
s.t.
∑
g∈G
egt = st,
(5)
where δgt denotes the cost parameter of generator g at time t.
1
2δ
g
t e
g
t
2 is the cost of generator g generating egt unit of power.
At different time, generators have different cost parameters.
For example, the cost parameter of solar generator is low
during daytime while the cost parameter of oil-fed generator
won’t change too much over time.
The optimization problem (GO) is a convex optimization
problem whose solution can be easily obtained [13]:
λt =
−st∑
g∈G 1/δ
g
t
, egt =
st
δgt
∑
g∈G 1/δ
g
t
(6)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. Based on the optimal
solution, we derive the following
β(t, st) =
1
2
δ¯ts
2
t , (7)
where δ¯t =
∑
g∈G
1
δgt
( 1∑
g∈G 1/δ
g
t
)2.
2) Optimal Consumption Allocation: Each user i opti-
mizes its power usage by effectively allocating power to
appliances. Let Ai = {ai1, ai2, ..., aiAi} be the set of Ai
appliances for user i such as air-conditioner, heater, dryer,
PHEV etc. Define an energy consumption scheduling vector
vit = [v
i,1
t , v
i,2
t , ..., v
i,Ai
t ] ∈ RA
i
+ , where v
i,a
t denotes the power
consumption that is scheduled for appliance a ∈ Ai of user
i. Each user i seeks to allocate power to its appliances by
maximizing their their total utilities. This can be written as
the consumption optimization problem (CO) as follows.
(CO) max
vit∈RAi+
Li(vit) = exp
{
σi
∑
ai∈Ai
ψi,at ln(v
i,a
t )
}
s.t.
∑
a∈Ai
vi,at = d
i
t,
(8)
where σi ≥ 0 is a sensitivity parameter with respect to the
demand; ψi,at ≥ 0, a ∈ Ai is a parameter that indicates the
importance and time-sensitivity of each appliance a ∈ Ai.
Without loss of generality, we assume that
∑
a∈Ai ψ
i,a
t = q.
The objective function Li : RA
i
+ → R+ can be equiv-
alently written into the form of products, i.e., Li(vi,at ) =∏
a∈Ai(v
i,a
t )
ψi,at σ
i
. Hence, the objective function is analo-
gous to Nash bargaining problems [14] and the outcome of
its solution embodies proportional fairness [15]. Due to the
monotonicity of the exponential function, (CO) is related to
the following equivalent consumption optimization problem
(ECO):
(ECO) max
vit∈RAi+
L˜i(vit) :=
∑
a∈Ai
ψi,at ln(v
i,a
t )
s.t.
∑
a∈Ai
vi,at = d
i
t,
(9)
where L˜i : RA
i
+ → R and Li = exp(L˜i). The optimization
problem (ECO) is concave. So we obtain the optimal solution
as follows.
vi,at = ψ
i,a
t d
i
t, λ
i
t = 1/d
i
t. (10)
The utility value of user i is the optimal value of the optimiza-
tion problem (CO). Hence, the utility value can be obtained
as
ui(t, dit) = ψ¯
i
td
i
t
σiq
, (11)
where ψ¯it = exp(
∑
a∈Ai ψ
i,a
t lnψ
i,a
t ) ∈ R+.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STACKELBERG DYNAMIC GAME
MODEL
The lower level decoupled optimization problem together
with the upper level Stackelberg dynamic game can be studied
jointly as a stochastic dynamic game with Stackelberg solu-
tion. In this section, we analyze the stochastic dynamic game
and characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium solutions.
A. Generalized Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
With the results of problems (CO) and let σi = 1/q for all
i ∈ N , the cost of user i can be specified:
Ci(di,d−i, s, pt) = E
T∑
t=1
−ψ¯itdit + ptdit +
1
2
αitd
i
t
2
. (12)
For the supplier, with the optimal generation allocation, his
cost can be expressed as
Cl(s,d, pt) = E
T∑
t=1
1
2
δ¯ts
2
t − stpt +
1
2
κt(st − dt)2. (13)
The cost functionals (12) and (13) together with the dynam-
ics of the price (1) and (2) from a generalized stochastic linear
quadratic dynamics game. To characterize the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the game with open-loop information structure
for both leader and followers [16], the concept of the open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution is defined below.
Definition 1. For a dynamic game in the form of (12), (13) and
(2), the strategy set {s∗, {di∗, i ∈ N}} with the corresponding
price p∗t constitutes an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium with
the supplier acting as the leader and the users acting as the
followers if the following conditions are satisfied.
1) {di∗ ∈ RT+, i ∈ N} is a Nash equilibrium given s∗, i.e.,
∀i ∈ N , we have
Ci(di∗,d−i∗, s∗, p∗t ) ≤ Ci(di,d−i∗, s∗, pt), ∀di ∈ RT+.
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2) {s∗ ∈ RT+} satisfies
Cl(s∗,Γ(s∗), p∗t ) ≤ Cl(s,Γ(s), pt), ∀s ∈ RT+,
where Γ(s) denotes the optimal response of the users,
i.e., the Nash equilibrium response given s.
To deal with the randomness in the linear-quadratic dynamic
game, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The set of open-loop stackelberg equilibrium
solutions for the stochastic linear quadratic dynamics game
(12), (13) and (2) corresponds with the set of open-loop
Stackelberg solutions for its deterministic counterpart, i.e., in
lieu of (1), the price evolves based on the following rule
pt+1 = Ft(pt, dt, st), pt=1 = p1 (14)
where Ft(pt, dt, st) = (1 + ωt)pt + γ(dt − st) and in lieu
of (12) and (13), the cost functionals are deterministic in the
following forms:
Ci(di,d−i, s, pt) =
T∑
t=1
−ψ¯itdit + ptdit +
1
2
αitd
i
t
2
, (15)
Cl(s,d, pt) =
T∑
t=1
1
2
δ¯ts
2
t − stpt +
1
2
κt(st − dt)2. (16)
Proof. For linear-quadratic stochastic dynamic games and un-
der the open-loop information structure, if the set {θ1, ..., θT }
is statistically independent of p1, which was our assumption
previous section, then the stochastic contribution completely
separates out [16]. Also, we have E[θt] = 0,∀t ∈ T.
Hence, the open-loop Stackelberg matches completely with
its deterministic counterpart.
To obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium, we need to char-
acterize the optimal response of the followers which is a
Nash equilibrium when s is given. Given st, t ∈ T, the
optimal response can be obtained by solving a affine-quadratic
dynamic game. One way of obtaining the Nash equilibrium
solution is to view the affine-quadratic dynamic game as static
infinite game by backward recursive substitution of (14) into
(15). The static infinite game is with cost function Cˆi(di,d−i)
for i ∈ N . The existence of pure Nash equilibrium for
this equivalent static game can be guaranteed [16] and the
uniqueness is guaranteed if some conditions on γ, αit and ωt
for t ∈ T are satisfied. These conditions can be easily obtained
by discussing the static quadratic game formed from the affine-
quadratic dynamic game. Here, we assume that the Nash
equilibrium of the affine-quadratic game is unique. Another
way is to utilize the Pontryagin’s maximum principle method
which gives the following lemma.
Lemma 1. To any announced supply strategy st ∈ R+ for t ∈
T, there exists an optimal response of the followers denoted
by {dˆit, i ∈ N , t ∈ T} satisfying the following relations: for
all i ∈ N and t ∈ T
pˆt+1 = (1 + ωt)pˆt + γ(
∑
i∈N
dˆit − st), pˆ1 = p1, (17)
dˆit = max
{ ψ¯it − pˆt − λit+1γ
αti
, 0
}
, (18)
λit = (1 + ωt)λ
i
t+1 + dˆ
i
t, λ
i
T+1 = 0. (19)
Here, {λi1, ..., λiT+1} for i ∈ N is a sequence of costate scalar
associated with the affine-quadratic dynamic game among
users.
Proof. Utilize the definition of the Nash equilibrium in
dynamic game [16]. The result follows directly from the
minimum principle for discrete-time control systems [16],
[17].
Remark 1. From (18) and (19), we can infer that λt is
nonincreasing over t which indicates the users prefer to
postpone their consumption. If the ψ¯it is sufficiently large, dˆ
i
t is
positive. If dˆit ∈ R++ for all i ∈ N and t ∈ R, the conditions
in Lemma 1 can be further developed.
Theorem 2. Given st, t ∈ T, if dˆit in Lemma 1 is an inner-
point solution for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T, the Nash equilibrium
{dˆit, i ∈ N , t ∈ T} of the affine-quadratic dynamic game and
the corresponding dynamics are given by
pˆt+1 = (1 + ωt)pˆt + γ(
∑
i∈N
dˆit − st), pˆ1 = p1, (20)
dˆit =
1
αit
(
qit − 1
αit(1 + ωt − γ/αit)
− 1)pˆt
+
ψ¯it
αit
(
1
αit(1 + ωt − γ/αit)
+ 1)
+
bit
αit
2
(1 + ωt − γ/αit)
,
(21)
for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T, where
qit =
(1 + ωt − γ/αit)(1 + ωt − γ
∑
j∈N 1/α
j
t )
1 + γ2
∑
j∈N q
j
t+1/α
j
t
qit+1
− 1/αit, qT+1 = 0;
(22)
bit = (1 + ωt − 1/αit)bit+1 + ψ¯it/αit
+
γ(
∑
j∈N ψ¯
j
t /α
j
t − st − γ
∑
j∈N b
j
t+1/α
j
t )
1 + γ2
∑
j∈N q
j
t+1/α
j
t
,
bT+1 = 0,
(23)
for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T.
Proof. Given the set of relations in Lemma 1, let λit be in the
following form λit = q
i
tpt + b
i
t. Substitute the λ
i
t and λ
i
t+1 in
(18) (19) by qitpt+b
i
t and q
i
t+1pt+b
i
t+1 respectively, then pulg
equation (18) into (17). Finally, combine equation (17) and
(19) to obtain the above presented closed-form solution.
Remark 2. Theorem 2 provides an efficient way to compute
the Nash equilibrium of the affine-quadratic dynamic game
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given supply schedule s. This result is a stepping stone for
characterizing the Stackelberg equilibrium of the original
problem. Compared with [2] that only gives a closed-form
Nash solution for Homogeneous users, we obtain a closed-
form Nash solution for a more general case.
With the optimal response of the users, to characterize the
Stackelberg equilibrium, one way is to view it as a finite
horizon discrete-time optimal control problem. Another way
is to form a nonlinear programming problem with objective
function (16) subject to the constraints provided by (20-
23). Here, we apply the second method and develop the
following theorem to characterize the Stackelberg Equilibrium
by utilizing the optimal response of users characterized in
Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. If {s∗} denotes an open-loop Stackelberg equi-
librium strategy for the supplier (leader) in the dynamic game
in the form of (14) (15) and (16), and {di∗, i ∈ N} is the
corresponding best response of the users (followers), there
exists vector sequences {θ1, ..., θT }, {µi1, ..., µiT }, {νi1, ..., νiT }
for i ∈ N such that the relations (21) (23) and the following
relations are satisfied
p∗t+1 = (1 + ωt)p
∗
t + γ(
∑
i∈N
di∗t − s∗t ), p∗1 = p1, (24)
s∗t =
p∗t + κtd
∗
t + γθt
δ¯t + κt
+
[γ/(1 + γ2
∑
j∈N q
j
t+1/α
j
t )]
∑
j∈N µ
i
t
δ¯t + κt
;
(25)
κt(d
∗
t − s∗t ) + γθt + νit = 0, ∀i ∈ N ; (26)
θt−1 = (1 + ωt)θt − s∗t −
∑
j∈N
νit(q
i
t − 1)
αit
2
(1 + ωt − γ/αit)
,
θT = 0;
(27)
µit+1 =
{
1 + ωt − 1
αit
− γ
2/αit
1 + γ2
∑
j∈N q
j
t+1/α
j
t
}
µit
+
νit+1
αit+1
2
(1 + ωt+1 − γ/αit+1)
,
µi1 = 0, ∀i ∈ N
(28)
for all t ∈ T, where qit, i ∈ N , t ∈ T are given by (22).
Proof. Since the problem is an optimal control problem in
discrete-time, it equivalent to a finite dimensional nonlinear
programming problem. To simplify the statement of the proof,
we write equation (21) as dit = Γ
i
t(pt, b
i
t), also we write
equation (23) as bit = Φ
i
t(b
i
t+1,b
−i
t+1). The Lagrangian of the
nonlinear programming problem can be written as
L =
{ T∑
t=1
1
2
δ¯ts
2
t − stpt +
1
2
κt(st − dt)2
+ θt{(1 + ωt)pt + γ(dt − st)}
+
∑
i∈N
µit{Φit(bit+1,b−it+1)− bit}+
∑
i∈N
νit{Γit(pt, bit)− dit}
}
(29)
where θt, µit and ν
i
t for i ∈ N , t ∈ T denote appropriate
Lagrangian multipliers. If {s∗} is a minimizing solution and
{di∗t , bit, i ∈ N , p∗t , t ∈ T} are the corresponding values of
the other variables, so that the constraints in Theorem 2 are
satisfied. Then it is necessary that
∂L
∂st
= 0,
∂L
∂dt
= 0,
∂L
∂pt
= 0,
∂L
∂bt+1
= 0, t ∈ T,
wherefrom (21) (23) and (24)-(28).
Remark 3. Note that γ, ωt, κt, δ¯t, αit, ψ¯it for i ∈ N , t ∈ T are
system parameters that are known. And qit for i ∈ N , t ∈ T
can be computed independently based on the rule (22). Then
the relations (21) (23) together with the relations (24-28) form
a set of linear constraints that characterizes the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the linear-quadratic game. There are (4N+3)T
constraints and (4N + 3)T unknowns where N is the number
of users. From (25), we know that as the price goes up, the
supplier tends to generate more energy to gain more profit.
Also, the supply increases as the demand increases.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we present simulation results to show the
demand response and the supply response under market-driven
dynamic price. We assume that there are 8 users in the market,
i.e., N = 8. Let γ = 0.05, ωt = −0.05. Suppose α1t = α2t =
α = 0.5, α3t = α
4
t = α
5
t = 0.6, α
6
t = α
7
t = α
8
t = 0.7 for
all t ∈ T and κt = κ = 0.3 for all t ∈ T. We consider the
horizon T = 20 days. Suppose each user have 3−5 appliances
including refrigerator-freezer (daily usage: 1.32kWh), electric
stove (daily use: 7.89kWh), heating (daily usage: 7.1KWh),
lighting (daily usage: 1KWh), Home electronics (daily usage:
0.5 KWh). We assign weights αi,a proportional to the level of
daily usage and normalize them between 0 to q. And we set
q = 5.
Suppose the supplier are equipped with 3 generators includ-
ing fixed gas thermal generator, solar generator and hydroelec-
tric generator with cost parameters δ1t = 1.5, δ
2
t = 0.8, δ
3
t = 1
dollar/KWh2. Choose initial price p1 = 1.5 dollar/KWh. In
Fig. 2, we present the optimal supply and the optimal demand
response from time 1 to time 20 based on the linear relations
that characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium. We can see that
the supply and the demand is not balanced at the beginning
days. The demand and the supply are tuned by the dynamic
price and get closer. The supply does not exactly match with
the demand but they are almost balanced in the later days. The
evolution of the price from time 1 to time 21 is presented in
Fig. 3. We set the initial price as 1.5. The price goes all way
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Fig. 2. The total demand of all users dt and the supply st for t = 1, ..., 20
down to 0.26 which indicates the market drives the price to a
reasonable value.
Fig. 3. The evolution of the price pt over time t = 1, ..., 21.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have jointly studied the optimal supply and
the distributed demand response under market-driven dynamic
price. A Stackelberg dynamic game has been utilized to model
the intertwined interactions among price, demand and supply.
At the lower level, a set of static optimization problems has
been formulated to solve the optimal power allocation prob-
lems for users and the optimal generation allocation problems
for the supplier. Given the supply schedule, we characterize
the optimal response from the uses by characterizing the
Nash equilibrium solution using a set of necessary conditions.
Further, the Stackelberg equilibrium has been characterized by
a set of linear constraints. Simulation results have shown that
the supply and the demand are tuned by the dynamic price to
be balanced.
Future work can focus on studying the case with multiple
energy providers and multiple users. Also, a Stackelberg
dynamic game with a large population of followers and how
the response would be when the number of followers N
approaches infinity are also of interest. For the lower level,
we can include storage devices and study their impact on the
generation cost, users’ utility and the entire power grid.
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